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Memory, motor-control, attention, learn-
ing, navigation, emotion, and perception
are among the foundations of cognitive
neurosciences. For many years, these
have been studied separately, as distinct
functions (Fodor, 2000). Recently, sev-
eral veins of research have lead to the
idea that different cognitive faculties
may be handled by similar neurocogni-
tive mechanisms. Likewise, Buzsáki and
Moser proposed that a range of inter-
acting cell types (such as “place cells,”
“grid cells” or “time cells”), which sup-
port navigation, may also play a role
in memory (Buzsáki and Moser, 2013).
Moreover, these prominent researchers
have suggested that navigation and mem-
ory rely on two fundamental mechanisms:
one that is more allocentric, related to
representations of landmarks in the envi-
ronment, and another that is egocentric,
self-referenced (Buzsáki andMoser, 2013).
Similarly to navigation, memory encom-
passes autobiographical memory, related
to events that happened to the expe-
riencer (self-referenced), and semantic
memory of events that the experiencer
“knows”. Perception may be taken from a
self-referenced first-person-perspective
or from a third-person-perspective.
Correspondingly, in the affective plane,
emotion may be self-referenced, reflecting
the experiencer own-feelings, or may be
dominated by a third-person-perspective,
when the experiencer is absorbed in the
life of others (Zinck, 2008).
Another vein of research, which
pointed to cross-modalities, relates to
“mental-lines.” Experiments on mental
number scaling in archaic cultures or chil-
dren have revealed that humans represent
numbers along a logarithmic scale, termed
“mental-number-line” (Dehaene and
Cohen, 1995; Dehaene et al., 1999, 2008).
Human experience numbers according to
the resolution of perception: the perceived
resolution decreases as numbers increase,
yielding logarithmic scale. Logarithmic
distribution was shown to fit the relation
between temporal-distance of the experi-
encer from the experience and memory
retention (Rubin and Schulkind, 1997;
Spreng and Levine, 2006). Moreover, cog-
nitive performance was found to decrease
logarithmically as temporal-distance to
the event increased (Arzy et al., 2009a).
Emotional expression was also found to
be represented by a mental-magnitude-
line (Holmes and Lourenco, 2011). It
is proposed that these common pat-
terns of magnitudes are related to the
self-referenced (spatial) processing of the
different domains.
The temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)
is believed to play a special role in
these self-referenced magnitude-related
processing. The TPJ was found to be
implicated in processing the mental-
number-line (Göbel et al., 2001) with
respect to quantity, numbers, or spatial
attention (Dehaene et al., 2003), and like-
wise may be involved in other mental-
magnitude-lines. However, the TPJ is
known to be involved in many self-
referenced functions including agency,
ownership, perspective-taking and auto-
biographical memory which are not nec-
essarily related to magnitude (Blanke
and Arzy, 2005). Likewise, in a couple
of investigation of the mental-time-line
(Arzy et al., 2009b), activation at the
right TPJ showed a symmetrical distri-
bution of brain activity as a function of
the temporal-distance of events from the
present time: activation was increased for
closer events than for more distant events
(both in past and future). The TPJ was also
found to play a special role in coordinat-
ing the relation between one’s self-location
in space and different external reference
points (Ruby and Decety, 2001; Vogeley
and Fink, 2003). In the personal/social
domain, the TPJ was found to coordinate
the relation between mentalizing oneself
and others (Lombardo et al., 2010).
Taken together, this suggests that dif-
ferent aspects of the subjective experi-
ence should be regarded in relation to
the experiencing self. Self-related mental-
ization may have a specific logarithmic
pattern, reflected as a “mental-line.” The
temporo-parietal junction may play a spe-
cial role in mediating these self-referenced
functions in the different domains.
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